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Abstract 
We examine corporate rentiership in the contemporary economy and suggest that the idea we 
are in a moment of step-change within capitalism may be premature.  Implicit in arguments for 
a step-change is the claim that the present-day economy emphasises unproductive or rentier 
forms rather than the more productive and entrepreneurial forms of the past.  In contrast, we 
argue that to understand our current situation we need to focus on the division of labour and 
most especially on processes of standardisation and the rise of intangible assets. Moving from 
Marx’s understanding of rent as a class relation, we re-embed rent within the circuit of capital 
and the realm of value distribution to investigate the class dynamics (among labour, capital and 
the state) through which giant firms seem to generate value out of rentierism.  We argue that 
these class dynamics include the crucial and unexplored relation between standardisation and 
intangibles. We suggest standardisation within the division of labour renders people, places, 
and things interchangeable and that, in contrast, intangible assets differentiate them.  When 
intangible assets emerge as new forms of property, they enable owners to generate scarcity and 
exert direct and/or indirect control over the wider division of labour.  Through examining the 
combined rise of standardisation and intangible assets within the technical division of labour, 
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we demonstrate how hierarchy within the social division of labour empowers some 
corporations to capture value produced elsewhere within the circuit of capital.   
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This special issue of Environment and Planning A posits that contemporary capitalism is 
different because of rentiership.  In raising this, the call for papers asks us to return to some of 
‘the classics on rent’ to better understand the current moment.  That the special issue is opening 
up an important area of enquiry is beyond doubt.  In different ways, unearned income emerges 
as a key contemporary fissure.  Mazzucato (2018) highlights how market power relations allow 
some to extract from others as rewards are skewed towards ‘takers’ rather than ‘makers’; in a 
chapter entitled ‘Revenge of the Rentiers’, UNCTAD (2017) suggests MNCs make increasing 
returns because rent is growing as a source of value; Burczak (2002) talks of a ‘winner takes 
all’ capitalism; and Lazonick (2014) and Meyer (2018) question the emphasis on shareholder 
returns to the detriment of society. In parallel, among apologists for current patterns of 
accumulation it is commonplace to argue businesses should embrace value capture strategies 
such as ‘open innovation’ to garner and privatise new ideas and processes emerging from 
beyond their organisational boundaries, e.g. from customers, unpaid interns, prize entrants for 
corporate competitions, etc (Chesbrough, 2006);  or that firms should ‘co-create value with 
customers’ whilst keeping said co-created gains (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004). In different 
ways value capture mechanisms appear as sources of concern and/or as changing. In particular, 
there is an emergent view that rentiership (this special issue) and the ‘revenge of the rentier’ 
characterised capitalism in the 2010s, including in the realms of finance and big tech, and that 
without intervention, rentiership will continue untrammelled in the 2020s. UNCTAD (2017, 
2018) has tested this claim, especially in its criticism of the so-called ‘superstar firms’, which 
capture rents created through mechanisms such as intellectual property. Similarly, the report of 
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the International Panel for Social Progress (2018) substantiates the argument that contemporary 
capitalism is different because of the rentierism of the corporate sector, the dominance of 
finance and the role of intellectual property. 
Often underpinning these analyses are notions of a ‘good’ or ‘productive’ capitalism 
versus a ‘bad’ or ‘unproductive’ capitalism. This is itself tentatively suggested in the call for 
this special issue, which pits entrepreneurship (good/productive) against rentiership 
(bad/unproductive).  In this article, we challenge views of productive capitalism and 
entrepreneurship as the antidote and alternative to rentier capitalism by adopting the 
perspective that in capitalism all productivity derives from capital’s exploitation of labour (i.e. 
the extraction of surplus value). In doing so, we reconnect rent and the current debate about 
rentierism to capital-labour relations. By drawing from Marx, who posits rent as a class 
relation, we return to some classics on rent and entrepreneurship – Thorstein Veblen and Joseph 
Schumpeter – to develop a closer understanding of the rentier’s re-emergence.  We explore 
some of the mechanisms of control that underlie ‘rentiership’ in the economy, or as we term it 
more generally, value capture. As such, the aim of this paper is to re-centre the rentierism 
debate with a class-relational lens that starts from the sphere of production of surplus value in 
the circuit of capital (e.g. divisions of labour and forms of exploitation), which today is 
increasingly centred on global production networks (Hudson, 2008; 422).  
We question the ‘newness’ of the contemporary period by suggesting that at the turn of 
the twentieth century the USA exhibited many similar tendencies towards rentierism (Godley 
2006, Fisk 2009, Veblen 2013).   We are not arguing nothing is new, clearly there are new 
characteristics, most obviously the global integration of capitalism on an unprecedented scale. 
To better grasp the current moment we start with an understanding of rent as a class relation 
rooted in the emergence of workers as market dependent labour-power (a proletariat) and the 
control of the division of labour. As a class relation, rents manifest capital’s capture and 
control of portions of surplus value always generated (i.e. extracted) in production and within 
the labour process. A conceptualisation of rent as a class relation – rather than a thing – is 
anchored to a materialist understanding of capitalism based on the circuit of capital:, the 
relation between the spheres of production, circulation and distribution and the governance and 
regulation of the circuit (Hudson 2008). As we shall see, this configuration is of crucial 
importance to both standardisation and intangibles. As developed by Marx, the circuit of capital 
indicates the different metamorphoses of value traversing production and circulation, where 
value is generated within the former and realised and unevenly distributed through the latter. 
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Once inserted in the circuit of capital rent shows its true nature, i.e. a redistribution of value 
away from labour to competing capitalists. This counters many accounts where rents seem to 
generate streams of value out of innovations and/or scarcities and instead reconnects rent to 
the original source of value extraction, namely labour exploitation and control.  We argue that 
far from there being a productive versus an unproductive capitalism or a good entrepreneurship 
versus a bad rentiership, there is merely capitalism, always exploitative even if characterised 
by ‘better’ or ‘worse’ distribution.   
Our understanding of the relation between the spheres of production and distribution 
examines how circuits of capital manifest more concretely, by engaging with the works of 
Veblen and Schumpeter to foreground two key processes in today’s global capitalism: 
standardisation and the rise of intangibles. Writing a century ago Veblen highlighted the 
corporate tendency to capture wealth and to distribute income to property ownership in new 
ways.  He suggested corporations decoupled production and rewards through a separation of 
what he called the ‘machine process’, where production and standardisation took place, and the 
‘business enterprise’ which was located in the realm of intangible assets (Veblen, 1980b 2013). 
In making his case for the widespread and increasing implementation of standardisation within 
capitalism’s machine process, Veblen highlighted its centrality to modern life.  His approach 
anticipated today’s ‘systems integrator’ or ‘superstar’ firms, which are able to control vast 
networks of global production – ‘global value chains’ – while owning only small portions of 
them (Nolan et al. 2002; Autor et al. 2017).  We might think of Veblen’s machine process as 
the technical division of labour which as it is altered, e.g. standardised, redistributes power and 
changes the hierarchy within the social division of labour.  One element of this recreation is 
the emergence of the business enterprise which, as we will demonstrate, embodies new power 
relations between capital and labour and importantly capital and capital, which then 
dialectically react back on the machine process (or technical division of labour).   
Coming from a different perspective, Schumpeter (1943) saw intangibles as a threat to 
entrepreneurship and hence economic development. For him, corporations use intangible assets 
to gain oligopolistic control of markets, to concentrate knowledge and curtail the room for 
entrepreneurship and economic development. Like Marx, both Veblen and Schumpeter 
examine crisis and the concentration of wealth (negative for Veblen, positive for Schumpeter).  
Both were early theorists of intangible assets that so influence current thinking about the 
contemporary economy.  However, they are insufficient in different ways because, like some 
today, they lack a materialist understanding and cling to notions of good/productive and 
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bad/unproductive capitalism, which we wish to overcome.  Both analysts harboured a suspicion 
of intangible assets and associated them with rents – it is perhaps no coincidence that today’s 
emphasis on rent goes hand in hand with the rise of an ‘intangible economy’ (Haskel and 
Westlake, 2018).   
Starting from dominant definitions of rent underpinning widespread notions of rentier 
capitalism, we locate rent together with other streams of value distribution and concur with 
Fine (1979) that rent can be investigated only empirically because it is a class relation that 
depends on historically and geographically specific forms of property. We then shift the focus 
to the conditions and processes underpinning the competition for value capture beyond 
production and analyse the relation between standardisation and intangibles as a way to 
reconnect the abstract workings of the circuit of capital to the concrete operations of global 
supply chains, as the quintessential organisational form of contemporary global capitalism.  
Drawing from Veblen’s distinction between the machine process and the business enterprise 
we develop a materialist understanding of their relation to argue that standardisation’s 
expansiveness in the contemporary economy enables the use of intangible assets to control the 
division of labour and capture value in the circuit beyond production.  But to understand this 
process one has to examine the role of capitalist control, competition and accumulation in ways 
that Veblen and Schumpeter did not.  Domination of the division of labour is necessary to 
capital accumulation and it gives rise to competition and concentration. In our analysis we 
argue intangible assets are increasingly crucial, but not new.  What is new is that their rise has 
expanded ways of determining the division of labour on a global scale and these are more 
prevalent today.   
In making this argument the rest of this article proceeds as follows.  First, we question 
the juxtaposing of rentiership and entrepreneurship as unproductive versus productive 
capitalism.  Second, we analyse the pre-conditions of scarcity. In sections three and four, we 
examine Veblen’s work on the machine process and the business enterprise to highlight the 
centrality of standardisation and the imposition of control.  We then relate the growth of 
standardisation to the rise of intangible assets within the economy.   We conclude by arguing 
that rather than living in a new age of the rentier, the twenty-first century has simply seen 




2. From rentierism to control in global production 
A core element of current understandings around rent is that it derives from control over a 
situation of scarcity. Prevailing understandings of rent within global value chain (GVC) 
analysis build on  Kaplinsky’s ‘technical-economic’ approach (Kaplinsky 1998; Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2001). For him, ‘[r]ent describes a situation where the parties who control a particular 
set of resources are able to gain from scarcity by insulating themselves from competition’ 
(Kaplinsky 2019, p.153). Or as Davis, Morris and Kaplinsky put it more succinctly: ‘Rent 
describes an environment of scarcity in the context of demand’ (2018; 47). Among his extended 
typology of rents, and of particular relevance to us here, Kaplinsky (2019) identifies 
‘endogenous rents’, alias innovative/entrepreneurial rents (see also, Davis et al 2018). These 
are characterised as Schumpeterian rents (see below) because rent is generated by producers in 
introducing better products, processes, or organisational forms that give them an edge on rivals. 
Successful innovation creates difference and allows innovators to gain rents from it. As a newly 
generated scarcity, difference vis-à-vis rivals becomes itself a form of economic development. 
Crucially, if it is not insulated the innovation can be copied by rival producers, and the 
differential and the scarcity are lost.  
We argue that this view is contradictory and partial. First, it implies that successful 
entrepreneurship is developmental and rentier, i.e. it produces ‘good’ (developmental?) rents. 
If entrepreneurship is both developmental and rentier – and entrepreneurship and rent are 
interdependent in providing economic development – the dominant view around a ‘much-
needed’ entrepreneurship vis-a-vis ‘wasteful’ rentiership (as somehow opposite poles) 
encounters an irrevocable tension.  If it is unable to reconcile this internal contradiction, the 
narrative transfers the analysis to the shaky terrain of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ rents. Second, this 
dominant view – as typified by Kaplinsky – overlooks that the associated value capture from 
generated scarcity cannot be automatically separated (let alone counter-posed) from the 
extraction of value in production because ‘scarcity’ is already located in the control of the 
division of labour.  This casts a long shadow on rent as a ‘technical-economic phenomenon’ 
(Haila 1990, 277) and highlights rent as a relation of control.   
Schumpeter, the doyen of entrepreneurship as development, recognises the importance 
of the relation of control. One way control is exerted is through ‘difference’.  As Schumpeter 
(1964; 39) puts it  ‘difference’ occurs in sectors of ‘monopolistic competition’ within which 
‘each firm offers products that differ in some way from every other firm in the sector and thus 
supplies a special market of its own’ – branding, intellectual property rights etc. help create 
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these “special markets”’.  With regards to ‘difference’, he further distinguishes between ‘real 
differences’ that are developmental and ‘putative differences’, which are instead stagnant 
(Schumpeter 1964; 32-42). Real differences entail forms of ‘disruptive combination’ that 
develop the economy – new goods, new methods of production, new markets, new sources of 
raw material or half-manufactured goods, and new organisational forms (Schumpeter, 2008; 
66). While putative differences are located in key intangibles (branding, product 
differentiation, intellectual property) that can create revenue streams as rent, interest, value 
capture, etc. Crucially for our argument, ‘putative differences’ typically emerge in markets 
characterised by standardised products which have to be differentiated somehow – so a Nike t-
shirt is not an Adidas t-shirt.  However, these putative differences lead to ‘circular flow 
economies’ which, if they ever achieve total equilibrium, make production ‘essentially 
profitless’ (Schumpeter, 2008; 31).  They do not lead to economic development.1   
Furthermore, Schumpeter makes a crucial distinction between ‘capitalists’ and 
‘entrepreneurs’ (as we will see, this is not a separation we accept). While capitalists take risks 
and provide finance, entrepreneurs do not take risk, but instead provide innovation through 
forms of ‘disruptive combination’ (Schumpeter, 2008; 65-66).  For Schumpeter capitalists are 
not driven simply by profit.  They will support (or hinder) entrepreneurial innovation to better 
control the circuit of capital so that it gives them greater access to a ‘potentially permanent 
income’ – for Schumpeter profit is not permanent (Schumpeter 1964, 100; 1983, 157-74 – on 
this today, see Sayer 2016; 62-4).  Because of this, Schumpeter (1964; 82) argues, capitalists 
may seek to sabotage entrepreneurship and innovation where it threaten revenues under their 
control. In this view, the rewards of ‘entrepreneurship’ are themselves subject to power 
relations between different agents so that entrepreneurs do not necessarily get the reward of 
their innovation.  This happens in large corporations where innovative staff may or may not be 
rewarded.  Innovative profit – surplus-profits – may be captured by more powerful groups such 
as activist shareholders manipulating share buy-backs to artificially boost prices before selling-
on (e.g. Lazonick 2014).  As Schumpeter (1964; 81) puts it, ‘Struggles for a share in profits are 
less important for our subject than the struggles to conserve the stream of profit itself’. Here 
the ‘stream’ of profit is more important than who gets it.  So again, entrepreneurship is tied to 
relations of control and the agency to extract profit or ‘permanent income’ (rent, interest, etc.). 
Schumpeter prioritises the continuous search for profits derived from the disequilibrium at the 
 
1 Importantly, for Schumpeter economies of circular flow can change but they do not develop – he likened the 
change to circulation of blood in an animal (Schumpeter, 2008; 64); i.e. change occurs in very small steps within 
the same framework, whereas development breaks the existing framework.  
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heart of entrepreneurship or, to put it slightly differently, innovations in the division of labour 
are important, but not how the profit is subsequently distributed amongst the actors. 
Schumpeter argues innovation and entrepreneurship create disequilibria and entrepreneurial 
profits but also, and less celebrated, potentially powerful groups snaffle these profits as rents, 
interest, i.e. ‘permanent income’. Thus, the relationship between ‘creative destruction’ and the 
distribution of value is uncertain within Schumpeter’s analysis and the distributive outcome is 
determined by relations of power and control (see Marx, 1976; 659).   
For example, when viewed through these entrepreneurial lens, nineteenth century 
American economic history is witnessed as a shift from entrepreneurial/innovative knowledge 
and skill as attributes of individuals to a world where entrepreneurial/innovative knowledge is 
the right of corporations (even if developed by individuals).  One instance of this concerns 
master dyers in the textile industry who developed and recorded their knowledge of dyeing in 
a book.  They would take this book and hence their entrepreneurial/innovative knowledge and 
skill to new employers or entrepreneurially become self-employed.  Here, agents’ knowledge 
gave them power.  However, reinterpretations of intellectual property and employment law 
located in changing views of the corporation’s role resulted in  the increasing denial of dyers’ 
agency. Instead, new laws gave the rights of dyers’ knowledge, and indeed the book itself, to 
the corporation. Beyond what they could remember (literally), dyers were now property-less if 
they left their employer, i.e. machine-free and knowledge-free.  More generally, in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, the US courts had recognised unequal power relations over the 
control of knowledge  and intervened to protect ‘genius from bad bargains’ (Fisk 2009; 67).  
The latter half of the century offered no such protections and created new forms of corporate 
property, which gave owners the capacity to control entrepreneurial/innovative knowledge and 
capture value they did not create.  
Once the assumed relations between entrepreneurship, innovation and rentiership are 
questioned and related to a continuum of profits, innovative rents, unearned rents, interest, 
good entrepreneurship and bad entrepreneurship, permanent revenue streams, etc. (Baglioni et 
al. 2019), it becomes clear we need an analysis of what are the pre-conditions for the generation 
of scarcity, rents, profits and revenue streams, namely the realm of control and power relations. 




3. The pre-conditions of scarcity 
For Marx, ground rent is a claim on a future portion of surplus value associated with the class 
relation of modern landed property. Marx’s ‘third class’ of landed property is actively 
organised around the possibility of appropriating or ‘capturing’ a portion of the value produced 
elsewhere in the circuit of capital (Neocosmos 1986). Ground-rent is but one possible outcome 
in the transformation of ‘surplus-profits’ – those above the system-wide average (Marx, 1981; 
780–7) – and is dependent ‘upon historically and socially specific relations between capitalists 
and landlords’ (Milonakis and Fine 2009, 67). Because of the ‘historical conditions of 
existence’ and thus specificity of the class of modern landed property in any particular time 
and place, there cannot be a ‘general theory’ of rent, ‘nor can the conclusions reached for one 
instance in which a rent relation exists be automatically applied to others’ (Fine 1979, 248; see 
also Ball 1980).  
Using the contrasting early-nineteenth century examples of Ireland and England, Marx 
(1981; 763-4) suggested the Irish tenant was a non-capitalist whose surplus labour and some 
of society’s ‘normal wage’ was captured as rent by landlords.  In contrast, English tenants were 
capitalists who had to take a smaller than average profit and give the remainder as ground rent 
to the landlord – modern landed property.  He goes on to say that in industrial regions, landlords 
can extort rents ‘bearing no relation to the soil’ from industrial workers (Marx, 1981; 763-4).  
Here, specific class dynamics – influenced by legislation, property rights, etc. – give rise to 
different rent relations, which become more complex and porous when examined empirically.  
Updating this for the contemporary context, the prevalence of ‘rents’ in processes of value 
capture vary concretely between sectors, industries and even among firms in the same ‘node’ 
of a GVC.  
Individual firms combine distinctive tactics and strategies to create a unique ‘recipe’ 
for creating/extracting value in production and capturing it in circulation and distribution. 
Marx’s ‘third class’ of modern landed property is sometimes difficult to segue, not least 
because, as Capps (2016) shows us, the same agent can perform different ‘class functions’.  
Explanation of the specific dynamics of class relations is thus necessarily an empirical 
question, and it starts to open up the analytical possibility of differentiating among ‘classes of 
capital’ (Baglioni 2015; Campling forthcoming). As in Marx’s time, firms today are not easily 
divided across the different spheres of the abstract schema of the circuit of capital: production, 
circulation and distribution, and its class relations, e.g. ‘capitalist’, ‘modern landed property’. 
The giant firms that drive today’s global supply chains often combine  ‘class functions’. For 
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example, major supermarkets simultaneously assume the buying and selling ‘functions’ of 
commercial capitalists; landed property rentiers through the control over access to retail space 
and the charging of rent to branded firms (e.g. slotting fees); and as bankers/financers through 
the speculative use of cash flow as money capital in institutional funds and in retail banking. 
Marx recognised the existence of unique recipes of value capture such as this. While making 
clear that rent can be delineated in the abstract (e.g. in the distinction between nineteenth-
century Irish and English tenant farmers), Marx noted that actual payments by capitalists to 
landed property may include more than surplus-profits and incorporate ‘foreign component[s]’ 
such as a landlord’s capture of a portion of the average profit of a tenant farmer and/or of the 
‘normal’ wages of agricultural workers. He used the category of ‘lease price’ to indicate these 
phenomenal possibilities of actual value capture (Marx, 1981; 763). This is an important 
insight because it further problematises thinking about rent and rentierism in the contemporary 
economy: is it so easy to divorce rent from other sources of surplus value  in the unique recipe 
of a firm’s accumulation strategy? 
However rents may manifest themselves, they are not independent sources of value; 
they represent a redistribution (Harvey 2006).  It is therefore to the relation between production 
and distribution that we now turn. This requires looking at competition for surplus value among 
capitals and the effect of this competition on the capital-labour relationship.  We focus on 
capital-capital relations, and, as we will demonstrate, how these relations are intimately bound 
up with intangible assets and standardisation as the drive to uniformity.2  Before we can 
understand contemporary ‘rentiership’, we need to understand the interplay between intangible 
assets and standardisation. Indeed, a stronger focus on this relationship can shed light on 
current interest in rentierism and its relation to labour exploitation.  
 The relation between standardisation and intangible assets remains unexplored in 
literatures on market power and the ‘global fragmentation of the production process’ from the 
1970s onwards (Feenstra 1998). Similarly, while a growing literature in mainstream economics 
 
2 It must be recognised that the state is central to the relationship between standardisation and intangible assets, 
e.g. intangible assets emerge as new property rights through the actions of state courts – commercial advertising 
products had themselves to be granted to the corporation as property (Fisk 2009).  This was far from guaranteed 
and was an outcome of a century of struggle in the material conditions of production, ownership, and resulting 
court conceptions of governance (Fisk, 2009; 237-9).  But other state and supra-state actions, e.g. endorsement of 
product regulations, creation of new standards etc. also expand intangibles (Hudson, 2008). Further, fiscal policy 
intimately shapes the logics of holding intangible assets over ownership of the ‘machine process’ because the 
global tax system works to allow, for example, intellectual property to be held offshore accruing the lowest 
possible tax on the profits produced at different nodes of global value chains (Quentin and Campling 2018).  




on the market power of ‘superstar firms’ emphasises the centrality of intangible assets to their 
ascendency (Autor et al. 2017; Ayyagari et al. 2018; McKinsey Global Institute 2018), it does 
not make the connection with standardisation as a central tangible mechanism by which such 
firms capture surplus-profits. Conversely, more critical work on intangible standards does 
recognise that they are ‘a way to exercise power over a defined domain and population without 
… the plain attributes of sovereign rights’ (Graz 2019: 52), but it does not relate this to the 
control of intangible assets more generally. Stephen Hymer’s (1970, 1979) pathbreaking work 
on FDI anticipated lead firms’ ability to control global production without ownership, which 
the GVC and global production network (GPN) literatures developed into chain or network 
governance (Gereffi 1994; Henderson et al. 2002). Far from a monolithic, univocal and static 
form of power, this scholarship has matured an understanding of governance as ‘diffuse, 
variable, dynamic and contested’ (Davis et al. 2018: 44).  Coe and Yeung (2015) build from 
the buyer-driven or ‘captive’ chain governance in GVC analysis by theorizing lead firms’ 
strategies to reproduce their leadership. While this more sophisticated understanding of 
governance sees power as resulting from complex relations among lead firms, states and non-
governmental institutions (Dallas et al. 2019), its original understanding of governance as the 
structuring of value chain divisions of labour (Gereffi et al. 1994) needs to be revisited through 
an understanding of standardisation. This is much more than ‘standards’ as the use of state and 
non-state institutional power to define the rules of the game for suppliers in the global economy 
(Ponte et al. 2011; Kaplinsky and Morris 2018), or what Dallas et al. call standards-setting as 
‘agenda-setting power’ (2019: 672).  
Veblen shows that standards are only one of the many facets of a broader process of 
standardisation as a structural power driving the division of labour.  He helps us to see more 
clearly that it is through standards that lead firms control what suppliers produce (product 
standards), how suppliers produce (process standards), and how and what they exchange 
(logistics as standardised exchange). In sum, standardisation oils the circuit of capital by 
allowing smoother transitions across time and space between the production and the circulation 
of value. Whilst often viewed as an evolutionary economist and/or institutionalist, the Veblen 
we shine a light on is closer to Marx (Sweezy, 1958).  As we deploy him, Veblen’s analysis is 
twofold: one an examination of standardisation and the drive for uniformity across industrial 
processes, and two, the emergence of the difference, turbulence and crisis that temporarily 
disrupts standardisation only to reboot it anew, in more concentrated and often more profitable 
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terms.  He termed these two contrasting tendencies ‘the machine process’ and ‘the business 
enterprise’.   
The sphere of the ‘machine process’ works through a sweeping standardisation and 
interdependence among its own sub-processes (Veblen 1908a, 2005; 53-63).  Human 
knowledge, a communal project, creates the industrial arts and these give rise to standardisation 
in order to produce for humanity.  In contrast, the business enterprise entails two simultaneous 
moves.  Firstly, it privatises the ‘industrial arts’ (our collective knowledge) for the benefit of 
the few.  This is an ongoing process because the evolution of capital is about the increasing 
privatisation and corporatisation of knowledge.  Thus the deskilling of craft workers in the 
technical division of labour represents a moment where capital captures knowledge it did not 
create and uses it to redesign production processes, which better exploit labour and recreate 
hierarchy (Braverman, 1974).  Part of this ongoing process is the creation and expansion of 
intangible assets, e.g. as we saw with the dyers’ books, intellectual property law ensures 
innovation no longer belongs to labour, but is assigned to capital. Furthermore, over time these 
intangible workers are subject to standardisation and routine in spheres such as innovation 
(Fisk, 2009; 173-6), marketing (Godley, 2006; 292-3) or other forms.  However, 
standardisation also helps to build intangible assets.  McDonald’s franchises roughly eighty per 
cent of its restaurants and standardises much of how the franchisee should act.  But every 
existing and new franchisee strengthens the brand’s intangible assets through the restaurant’s 
architecture, trademarked design and look.   Secondly, the business enterprise bifurcates 
capitalists into two opposing groups – those engaged in the business enterprise (the ‘pecuniary 
magnates’ who ‘operate on a higher plane as capital at large’) and those largely operating as 
‘capitalist-employers’ (Veblen 1908b; 133).  The latter are subjected to supply chain 
governance processes that can result in Nolan et al’s (2008) ‘cascade effect’ where suppliers 
centralise (e.g. via M&As) to meet the cost pressures and standards of business enterprise ‘lead 
firms’ at the apex of global production (see also, Nolan 2012).  
Taking this a step further is Starosta’s (2010a) enhanced capital-small capital schema. 
‘Normal’ capitals are characterised by an average rate of profit, generalised processes of 
concentration and centralization, and they actively seek to exercise market power-based control 
relations (such as the threat and ability to exclude) so as to try to appropriate a portion of the 
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surplus value that ‘small’ or ‘weak’3 capitals relinquish (Starosta 2010a). An outcome of this 
relationship is that normal capital can use strategies such as rent-capture to become enhanced 
capital when it is able to systematically accumulate surplus-profits (those above the average). 
Weak capitals are ‘the losers in the competitive war that nonetheless manage to extend their 
lifespan through systematic valorization at a rate of profit below the general one’ (Starosta 
2010a: 447). Weak capital survives because neither normal nor enhanced capital is interested 
in investing in the ‘low-profit’ functions of a value chain (Starosta 2010b). These relations are 
not static so weak capitals may be reconstituted as ‘normal’ capital through the cascade effect, 
as Appelbaum’s (2008) research shows for giant electrical goods manufacturers and Kumar 
(2019) for global garment suppliers. Starosta’s schema is a dynamic one based on a qualitative 
differentiation of capitals-in-competition, where capitalist managers have agency to develop a 
diversity of tactics and strategies to accumulate and thus any particular trajectory of a firm to 
becoming ‘enhanced’ will be necessarily contingent on sectoral and historical-geographical 
dynamics (e.g. Campling, forthcoming). Through this lens we can see that the relative market 
power – or ‘rentiership’ – of ‘lead firms’ in a particular industry is not the cause of increased 
profits in absolute terms but an expression of differential rates of profit in the relative context 
of the relations of power within the system as a whole (Starosta 2010b: 544, 550).  
We build on Starosta’s theorisation to examine two central processes that enable the 
(re)production of enhanced capital via the appropriation of a greater share of surplus value from 
global production (surplus-profits and ‘foreign components’).  As we shall see, at the heart of 
the machine process and the business enterprise are standardisation and intangibles. 
Standardisation homogenises products and markets, while, through ‘putative differences’, 
intangibles differentiate products and markets and centralise power relations to empower some 
and disempower others.   
4. Standardisation as control and imposition 
It is well known that standards are a basis for competition and coordination between capitals 
in trade facilitation and development (Gibbon et al. 2010, STDF 2019) and in the creation of 
new global markets (Graz 2019). Less well recognised is the class-relational dynamics of 
standardisation and its role in differential accumulation in the division of labour. Our reading 
of Veblen is that his analysis of the machine process made him an early commentator on the 
 
3 ‘Small’ here is not equated with scale – large firms can be ‘small’ in terms of the supply chain power they have 
and the portion of surplus value that they are able to hold on to – a power relation that, we argue, is often closely 
associated with their capacity to marshal intangible assets.  To avoid confusion we replace ‘small’ with ‘weak’. 
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class dimension of standardisation (see also Silver’s 2003 development of Vernon’s product 
life cycle theory 1966).   Veblen defined the machine process as being ‘made up of interlocking 
detail processes, rather than as a multiplicity of mechanical appliances each doing its particular 
work in severality’ (Veblen 2013: 10).  In its production of tangible products, the machine 
process works through ‘sweeping standardisation’, i.e. the relentless drive within technical 
divisions of labour for uniformity.  This uniformity proceeds by standardising the means of 
production, human labour, and finished products to generate a ‘new industrial order’ (Veblen, 
2005; 37-40), where humanity’s creative capacity has shifted from craft, guild and workshop, 
to the global behemoth of the factory (Freeman 2018). For Veblen, within this new order, it is 
intellectual capacity and coordination that create value, not workers or materials – these remain 
indispensable, but secondary.  Added to this, as capitalism develops and becomes ever more 
coordinated it also becomes more dominated by large organisations seeking to privatise. 
Standardisation as standards, rules, routines, regulations, processes emerge as the bedrock of 
production (where Taylorism is perhaps its apogee, see Hanlon 2016; Baglioni et al. 2019). 
The overwhelming compulsion for conformity is the first and foremost entry barrier within 
industrial capitalism: 
Irregularity, departure from standard measurements in any of the measurable 
facts, is of itself a fault in any item that is to find a use in the industrial process, 
for it brings delay, it detracts from its ready usability in the nicely adjusted process 
into which it is to go; and a delay at any point means a more or less far-reaching 
and intolerable retardation of the comprehensive industrial process at large. 
Irregularity in products intended for industrial use carries a penalty to the 
nonconforming producer which urges him to fall into line and submit to the 
required standardization (Veblen, 2013:11). 
In this analysis, as in Marx, standardisation smooths out the circuit of capital and enables 
cutting edge industries to lead societal change because ‘these greater industries now make the 
pace and set the standards of management and valuation for the rest’ (Veblen, 2005; 39-40).  
For example, the logistical industries of communications and transport have at different times 
been at the forefront of capitalist development. First, in terms of the standardising processes 
within the logistics industry itself – steam then diesel, palletisation, containerisation, 
intermodality; and second, in the central role of logistics in capitalist planning of fragmented 
global production, spatially expanding capitalist circuits and strategies for capital 
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accumulation; pitting firm against firm; worker against worker; and transforming labour 
regimes in ever-more outward facing ways (Campling and Colás, 2021).  
At the core of these great industrial processes are inter-dependence and 
interchangeability.  The automobile is another key historic example of how interchangeability 
and inter-dependence emerge.  The production of an automobile moved from being handmade 
to a standardised commodity located in routine processes that made labour interchangeable.  
However, automobiles also made industries inter-dependent through a concatenation of 
processes so that auto parts producers supply to specific standards or lose their role and 
logistical coordination of networks become central (Winchester, 2018; 129-72; Campling et al. 
2020).  As Veblen (2013; 10) expressed it 
None of the processes in the mechanical industries is self-sufficing. Each follows 
some and precedes other processes in an endless sequence, into which each fits 
and to the requirements of which each must adapt its own working.  
As such, standardisation (theoretically, but never entirely in practice) does a variety of things.  
It de-links production and place so that homogenised labour becomes interchangeable and one 
source of labour can be made to compete with another (often located in another place).  It 
deskills labour to enable capital to more easily choose between groups of workers based on the 
production of difference by drawing on, gender, ethnicity, etc. in order to globally develop ‘a 
hierarchy of labour-powers, to which there corresponds a scale of wages’ (Marx, 1976; 469) .  
Furthermore, it standardises consumption to speed up the circuit of capital through the creation 
of habits and routines and simultaneously ties production systems more closely together in 
supply chains spreading across continents and dominated by lead firms (Veblen, 2013, 1908; 
Baglioni et al. 2019).  
As a process, standardisation is fraught with tensions and contradictions. It encounters 
workplaces as simultaneously a vehicle and an obstacle of value production in that workers’ 
bodies are at once the means and barrier to the transformation of labour power into value 
(Baglioni and Campling 2017). So, while production necessarily needs to ‘touch down’ where 
it will be more or less territorially embedded (Henderson et al. 2020), standardisation 
intervenes to partially transcend the limits of workplaces – their spatial, temporal and social 
embeddedness.  It does so by creating the conditions for workers and labour regimes to be put 
into generalised competition with one another so that the circuit of capital can proceed apace 
(Taylor 2008). This is never automatic. Workers’ and other forms of resistance and reworking 
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are always contesting these processes (e.g. Castree et al. 2004) and bottlenecks or ‘chokepoints’ 
in global production networks can sometimes provide workers with leverage (Alimahomed-
Wilson and Ness 2018; Selwyn 2007).  Dynamics of standardisation are always class-
relational.  
As a representation of Veblen’s limitation, standardised industrial processes are largely 
unproblematic because, in his idealistic view, the ‘engineering’ type functionary of the 
‘industrial arts’ is a benign figure – a conduit for human progress; generating what Schumpeter 
sees as a circular flow economy of equilibrium and mass produced standardised products. This 
conduit’s role is usurped by business enterprise functionaries who limit potential productivity 
by deciding what should and should not be produced based on calculations of profit or rent, 
interest and ‘permanent revenue streams’ and, indeed through sabotaging innovation, to keep 
revenues high.  For the business enterprise, standardising machine processes empower capital 
to ‘free’ it from production whilst maintaining control of it at a distance thereby allowing the 
business enterprise to gain further control of the circuit of capital and the social division of 
labour. Here, Veblen’s (1908b, 2005, 2013) business enterprise acts like Schumpeter’s (1964) 
capitalist-rentier. It is the control that standardisation enables, which allows Apple to take 58 
percent of the retail price from an iPhone made within its global supply chain and improve its 
year-on-year operating profit while, in parallel, its principal final assembler – Foxconn 
Technology Group – experiences a declining rate of profit (Chan et al. 2013; Kraemer et al. 
2011). This outcome is made possible through Apple’s pursuit of cheap inter-changeable, 
deskilled labour to oil the wheels of huge machine processes in Foxconn’s network of factories 
(which employ 1.4 million workers globally and 1 million in China alone, Freeman 2018; 272).    
Further, Veblen (1908b, 125-33) suggested that ownership increasingly shifts from 
small capitalist-employers to evermore concentrated and centralised firms seeking 
opportunities to capture value; a tendency first identified by Marx in the late nineteenth century 
and convincingly mapped again and again in the twenty-first century (Nolan and Zhang 2010; 
Starrs 2013; UNCTAD 2018).  A key feature of this centralisation is its relationship to 
disequilibrium.  The machine process prioritises equilibrium because it builds on coordination 
across international borders.  Theoretically, manufacturers need rubber and steel to build 
automobiles but only in certain quantities at certain times to meet certain demand.  However, 
the business enterprise is less interested in improving efficiencies of production and more 
interested in disequilibrium, buying cheap and selling dear, hoarding resources, investing or 
divesting in other companies to capture value, e.g. as rents, interest on loans, share buybacks, 
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asset stripping, brands, etc. (Baglioni et al. 2019, Lazonick, 2014).  Importantly, 
standardisation enables comparison and control so that suppliers – like earlier English tenant 
farmers – are ‘only permitted to invest’ (Marx 1976; 764) in an industry by submitting to 
competition on terms set by lead firms.  Suppliers are pitted against one another so that 
standardised machine processes, combined with logistics, allow for the separation of workers 
across firms and/or national jurisdictions, undermining labour’s ability to combine and contest 
capitalist control (Greer and Hauptmeier 2016; Lebowitz 2003; Peoples and Sugden 2001). In 
short, the business enterprise scans the standardised market to create or take advantage of 
disequilibria and the opportunities it brings.  A central feature facilitating this is the rise of 
intangibles.   
5. Intangibles, disequilibrium and value capture  
One consequence of machine process-driven standardisation is a massive increase in 
productivity.  Standardisation is a double-edged sword for capital.  On one edge, it allows 
capital to grow exploitation through productivity increases, deskilling, improving capital 
mobility and – crucially for this article – widening the available search for differentiation and 
disequilibria amongst labour regimes and ‘weak’ capital across the globe.  On the other edge, 
standardised processes tend towards homogenised products which encourage price sensitivity: 
if one is interested in telling the time what is the difference between a Rolex  or a Timex? The 
business enterprise develops to create scarcity and/or difference to limit the impact of price 
sensitivity through intangible assets, e.g. brands, patents, trademarks, channel relationships 
(Aaker 1991; 16).  
For Veblen, the line between the tangible and the intangible is unclear.  Innovation is a 
good example of this blurring. Just as research and development is an intangible asset which 
has emerged out of worker practises, juridical decision-making and organisational change 
(Fisk, 2009) so it came to be controlled by corporations, even if publicly funded (Mazzucato 
2013).  However, it is also at the centre of the tangible economy.  As we saw, over the late 
nineteenth/early twentieth century, knowledge was stripped from being a ‘personal attribute’ 
of specific producers and transferred as new forms of property to corporations (the master dyer 
example earlier). Thus many intangible assets emerged from knowledge that was captured and 
privatised in the interests of capitalist property rights.4  
 
4 Importantly, even in the master dyer example, ‘a critical history of technology would show how little any of the 
inventions of the eighteenth century are the work of a single individual’ (Marx, 1976; 493 ft. 4) 
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Intangible assets – marketing, brands, innovation, reputation, etc. – grow in importance 
as capitalism develops. Unlike tangible assets they do not generate value, they distribute it; 
they do not get consumed through use, but expand through it; and rather than producing things, 
they produce new habits, aspirations, affects.  However, the expansion of these assets is 
intimately linked to standardisation and knowledge capture.  The use of intangibles empowers 
corporations to redistribute value towards owners of the intangible.  For Veblen, intangibles 
are always predicated on tangibles – or the business enterprise on the machine process – and 
central to this relation is value capture.  The business enterprise arises to transcend machine 
process standardisation.  It aims to limit standardisation’s stagnancy and generate profits 
through the creation of intangibles and, as we will see, scarcity. Intangibles are non-value 
producing immaterial assets with a non-technological character that are income-yielding: ‘they 
serve no materially productive work, but only a differential advantage to the owner in the 
distribution of the industrial product’ (Veblen, 1908b, 115; see also Quentin 2020). This is 
crucial to our argument. Intangible assets do not start on a level playing field, or spring from 
the genius of some entrepreneur, but are rooted in the social division of labour which gives 
‘differential advantage’ of some social groups over others.  In other words, intangibles inscribe 
the privilege of a small minority over others and by virtue of this differential, owners of 
intangibles create more difference to take advantage of existing power relations within the 
division of labour in order to further accumulate wealth.  Intangibles manufacture scarcity. For 
example, patents and brands generate quasi monopolies: only McDonalds can deploy the 
golden arches sign and a transportation company cannot call itself American Express.   
Another feature of intangible assets, is that they expand and are reinforced through their 
use.  For example, extending a patent by ever-greening enables a pharmaceutical company to 
continue to extract rents from the overpricing of brand-name drugs and reinforce its brand or 
corporate reputation as an important actor in the field with regulators, health professionals, 
potential firms of acquisition, and generic drug manufacturers as future partners when the 
patent runs out (Chalmers, 2006; Kesselheim et al. 2016).  Thus, like a muscle, the intangible 
is strengthened in use – old brands dominate old industries.  For example, across 22 product 
markets for fast moving consumer goods (e.g. toothpaste, biscuits, tea, etc.), 19 of the leading 
brands in 1925 were still the leading brand in 1985, two of the remaining three firms were the 
second brand leader, and one was fifth (Aaker 1992; Table 3-4).  Intangible assets enhance 
corporate power and rivals simply find it difficult to overcome the brand recognition barrier to 
entry – they cannot penetrate, what Schumpeter calls, the ‘special market’. As such, the 
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property rights of intangible assets forcefully insert power relations into the machine process 
and the wider economy. Intangible asset success increases barriers to entry and although they 
are unproductive, in the sense that they do not generate new wealth, they do distribute existing 
wealth generated by the machine process to strengthen the business enterprise (Veblen 1908b, 
117). Therefore, intangibles are inherently relational in a double sense: the value accrued is 
generated elsewhere, in relation to production and at the expense of someone else (the owner 
of the machine process, the community, the worker). This already anticipates that the business 
enterprise controls the machine process and it helps to operationalise Starosta’s enhanced 
capital-weak capital schema. 
Furthermore, as with Schumpeter’s (1964; 71) ‘trustified’ rather than ‘competitive’ 
capitalism, capital in the business enterprise moves away from a direct input in production to 
one of providing finance, securing intellectual property, controlling firms at a distance, 
capturing value by creating new property forms (Fisk 2009), buying up businesses in order to 
seek ‘unearned income’, etc. (Veblen 2005; 47).  Veblen argues: 
The basis of the business enterprise on the higher plane is capital-at-large, as 
distinguished from capital invested in a given line of industrial enterprise, and it 
becomes effective when wealth has accumulated in holdings sufficiently large to 
give the holder a controlling weight in any group or ramification of business 
interests into which he may throw his weight by judicious investment. (1908b; 135. 
Emphasis added) 
Control further feeds from the fact that while the tangible is measurable, the intangible is less 
so – this difficulty of measurement can be seen in brand equity value, which is often under or 
over estimated by 30 per cent (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2000; 16).  One way of conceiving 
of this is to think about the value derived from a t-shirt with or without a Nike swoosh. Without 
a logo, a cotton t-shirt is simply a cotton t-shirt and the costs of its production are measurable 
– labour, raw materials, equipment, transportation. In contrast, for Veblen (2005, 85-113), 
intangible assets muddy the waters.  He argues the costs of the intangible work involved in 
creating a ‘prospective gain’ increases with capitalist development and becomes ‘a necessary 
cost of production’ and, indeed, a barrier to entry.  Once the brand or patent begins to deliver 
a steady stream of ‘free income’, the cost of maintaining its value actually creates an asset and 
a legitimate overhead charge (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2000).  Further, and as we argue here, 
the process of brand valuation side-steps the question of where the value comes from in any 
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given global production network, e.g. do intangible assets  ‘add’ value or are they used to 
capture value from weak capitals? (See, also Quentin and Campling 2018; Quentin 2020.) 
A question that emerges is, which is the more powerful driver of value – the 
manufacture of say a tangible t-shirt or the intangible value of the brand? Although the 
intangible is always built on the tangible (there must be a tangible t-shirt for the ‘swoosh’ to be 
stitched into), Veblen (1908b; 123-4) argues the intangible is the more powerful because it 
creates quasi-monopoly enhanced control of the division of labour.  These mechanisms of 
quasi-monopoly – Schumpeter’s ‘special markets’ – include new corporate property rights such 
as patents, copyright, ownership of workplace knowledge, trade secrets, reputation, etc., but 
also the creation of new routines, easy semi-scripted behaviours, or aspirations generated by 
intangible assets (Aaker 1991; Ritzer 1993, Godley 2006, Fisk 2009).  As noted, the business 
enterprise goal is not necessarily to improve production, but to increase the role of intangible 
assets themselves because these allow quasi-monopoly value capture.  In short, once 
investments in intangible assets become established, these costs are exploited to capture value 
from ‘production’.   
Intangibles are increasingly used to weaken the position of tangible producers by acting 
as barriers to entry.  Hence, combined with its command of vast volumes of sales – and supply 
contracts – Nike has power over its t-shirt suppliers to extract a disproportionate amount of 
value. Whether or not this is entirely or always ‘rentier’ is perhaps beside the point because 
overall, while the machine process spurs homogeneity of production and consumption, the 
business enterprise takes the differences lying in society to the realm of business relations in 
order to gain from them and expand them.  It does so by maintaining homogeneity in the 
technical sphere of production, but creating putative differences beyond. For example, fast 
fashion highlights difference and rapid changes in taste, but this flexibility is built on 
standardised production and distribution networks.  Indeed, much of the flexibility in the new 
economy is dependent on rationalisation and mass production (Thompson, 2003) so that 
intangibles presuppose the machine process (i.e. the process of material production) and 
broader social divisions of labour and inequality, which they then magnify. As such, the 
relation between the machine process and the business enterprise is dialectical, one is the realm 





As we flagged in our introduction, we question the significance of rentierism as a way of 
understanding the contemporary economy and the dichotomies presented in some of the 
scholarship on distribution and value, which seem to revolve around rent versus 
entrepreneurship and/or ‘productive’ versus ‘unproductive’ capitalism.  It is not that rent is not 
occurring, rather that it is an outcome of other processes.  We argue for a focus on relations of 
power and control within the technical and social divisions of labour because this is the 
foundation of distributive practices.  Distribution strategies are always located in power 
relations within the division of labour (Marx 1976; 655-67) and, relatedly, regulatory strategies 
determined by states and supra-state institutions in light of such struggles (Hudson 2008, 428).  
In this rendition, we should relate rent, profit, interest etc. back to production and the circuit of 
capital.  Hence there is no productive versus unproductive capitalism, or entrepreneurship 
versus rentiership, there is capital’s exploitation of labour and then better or worse distributive 
outcomes.    
If we see rent as a class relation, then relations of power become key to any analysis 
because moments of value extraction will vary as relations change. In making this argument 
we are not refuting the idea of rent or rentiership per se – far from it, but we are suggesting that 
it is a second order problem. By focusing on relations of power and value capture within the 
circuit of capital and the division of labour’s current dominant organisational forms, e.g. lead 
firms, system integrators, enhanced capital, etc., we can link distributive outcomes to 
standardisation and intangible assets. However, this is not new.  Rather, it is a return to a less 
fettered capitalism built on neo-liberal regulatory structures which empower the business 
enterprise through new machine processes – e.g. containerisation, ICT, automation, etc. – that 
enable capital to traverse space more efficiently to expand capitalist social relations (e.g. 
China’s integration into the capitalist world economy).  Importantly, these new machine 
processes are only the latest in a long line of standardised production processes empowering 
capital.  
Central to our analysis is the relationship between the machine process and the business 
enterprise (which manifest as standardisation and intangible assets).  As has been long argued, 
the technical division of labour is subject to standardisation.  This is a process driven not simply 
by labour control, but also by a desire of lead firms to gain hegemony over production processes 
within a supply chain that may or may not be owned by them.  The homogenisation of the 
machine process within a of a supply chain enables capital greater freedom to make inter-
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changeable labour-powers compete; allows lead firms to push less profitable activities onto 
weak capitals; and make weak capitals compete within its supply chain.  Homogeneity also 
gives enhanced capital greater control of its market by being able to say to customers, as Singer 
did a century ago, ‘we guarantee consistency in our product’ so that the act of purchase 
becomes more routine and thereby enhances intangible assets further (Ritzer, 1993, Veblen 
2013).  Thus standardising machine processes in technical divisions of labour provides 
enhanced capital with greater control over labour, weak capital, and markets – the circuit of 
capital.   
However, in order to exploit the advantage of homogenisation, enhanced capital 
increasingly turns to the business enterprise or intangible assets leaving weak capital to occupy 
the terrain of the machine process.  We can best demonstrate this using an exaggerated ‘ideal 
type’.  Business enterprise capital focuses on intangible assets such as marketing and brands, 
intellectual property rights, finance, research and development, etc., to then create an artificial 
scarcity.  Paradoxically, the business enterprise is used to overcome the undermining of scarcity 
that is made possible by standardisation and mass production.  In so doing, it allows those with 
property rights to reconfigure the social division of labour in their own interests or have 
influence over the distribution of the value produced in ‘their’ production network in particular 
directions.  Through focusing on the development of standardisation and intangible assets in 
the division of labour, we can better understand the production and distribution of value in the 
circuit of capital.  These two, co-constituted, forms enable the concentration and centralisation 
of capital and empower some capitals to capture value at different points in the circuit of capital 
which they own and/or control – even if they do not create this value.  This enhances capitals 
with intangible assets.  In so doing, these processes distribute wealth to the already powerful 
and hence are central to the expanding inequality prevalent today as characterised by the notion 
of rentierism.  These developments are not new, but they appear to be intensifying with global 
capitalism.  Veblen and Schumpeter voiced concerns about this almost a century ago.  Building 
on Marx’s insights, we argue these processes are foundational to the tendency towards 
concentrated and centralised capital.  Further, we would argue that rent can tell us how this 
wealth is distributed, which is useful, but on its own this is insufficient and needs to be 
augmented with an analysis of production in the division of labour.   
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